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Abstract. We show that the model-checking problem is decidable for a frag-
ment of the epistemic µ-calculus with imperfect information and perfect recall.
The fragment allows free variables within the scope of epistemic modalities in a
restricted form that avoids constructing formulas embodying any form of com-
mon knowledge. Our calculus subsumes known decidable fragments of epistemic
CTL/LTL, may express winning strategies in two-player games with one player
having imperfect information and non-observable objectives, and, with a suitable
encoding, decidable instances of the model-checking problem for ATLiR can
be encoded as instances of the model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of
knowledge.
1 Introduction
The µ-calculus of knowledge is an enrichment of the µ-calculus on trees with individ-
ual epistemic modalities Ka (and its dual, denoted Pa). It is designed with the aim that,
like the classical modal µ-calculus, it would subsume most combinations of temporal
and epistemic logics. The µ-calculus of knowledge is more expressive than linear or
branching temporal epistemic logics [12, 20], propositional dynamic epistemic logics
[21], or the alternating epistemic µ-calculus [4]. On the other hand, some gaps in its
expressive power seem to exist, as witnessed by recent observations in [4] showing that
formulas like ⟪a⟫p1Up2 are not expressible in the fixpoint version of ATL. This ex-
pressivity gap can be reproduced in the µ-calculus of knowledge, though the µ-calculus
of knowledge is richer than the alternating µ-calculus.
A rather straightforward fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus which has a decid-
able model-checking problem is the one in which knowledge modalities apply only
to closed formulas, that is, formulas in which all second-order variables are bound by
some fixpoint operator. The decidability of this fragment follows from recent results on
the decidability of the emptiness problem for two player games with one player having
incomplete information and with non-observable winning conditions [6].
However more expressive fragments having a decidable model-checking problem
seem to exist. For example, winning strategies in two-player games with imperfect in-
formation can be encoded as fixpoint formulas in the µ-calculus of knowledge, but
not in the above-mentioned restricted fragment. The same holds for some formulas in
ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall (ATLiR) [19, 3]: the ATL formula
⟪a⟫ ◻ p can be expressed in a modal µ-calculus of knowledge as νZ. ⋁
α∈Acta
Ka(p ∧
⋀
β∈ActAg∖{a}
[α,β]Z). And there are variants of ATLiR for which the model-checking
problem is decidable [7]. Note that a translation of each instance of the model-checking
problem for ATL into instances of the model-checking problems for the µ-calculus of
knowledge is also possible but requires the modification of the models, as suggested on
page 8 below.
Our aim in this paper is to identify such a larger fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus
for which model-checking is decidable. The fragment we propose here allows an epis-
temic modality Ka to be applied to a non-closed µ-calculus formula φ, but in such
a way that avoids expressing properties that construct any variant of common knowl-
edge for two or more agents. Roughly, the technical restriction is the following: two
epistemic operators, referring to the knowledge of two different agents a and b, can be
applied to non-closed parts of a formula only if the two agents have compatible obser-
vations (in the sense that the observability relation of one of the agents is a refinement
of the observability relation of the other agent). The variant presented here relies on a
concrete semantics, in the sense of [9], with the observability relation for each agent a
being syntactically identified by a subset Πa of atomic propositions. We require this in
order to syntactically define our fragment of µ-calculus of knowledge with a decidable
model-checking problem: the compatibility of two observability relations ∼a and ∼b is
specified at the syntactic level by imposing that either Πa ⊆Πb or vice-versa.
The epistemic µ-calculus with perfect recall has a history-based semantics: for each
finite transition system T , the formulas of the epistemic µ-calculus must be interpreted
over the tree unfolding of T . This makes it closer with the tree interpretations of the
µ-calculus from [10]. For the classical µ-calculus, there are two ways of proving that
the satisfiability and the model-checking problem for the tree interpretation of the logic
is decidable: either by providing translations to parity games, or by means of a Finite
Model Theorem which ensures that a formula has a tree interpretation iff it has a state-
based interpretation over a finite transition system (this is known to be equivalent with
memoryless determinacy for parity games, see e.g. [5]).
The generalization of the automata approach does not seem to be possible for epis-
temic µ-calculus, mainly due to the absence of an appropriate generalization of tree
automata equivalent with the µ-calculus of knowledge. So we take the approach of pro-
viding a generalization of the Finite Model Theorem for our fragment of the epistemic
µ-calculus. This result says roughly that the tree interpretation of a formula over the tree
unfolding of a given finite transition system T which contains the epistemic operators
Ka or Pa is exactly the “tree unfolding” of the finitary interpretation of the formula in
a second transition system T ′, which is obtained by determinizing the projection of T
onto the observations of agent a, a construction that is common for decidable fragments
of temporal epistemic logics. Our contribution consists in showing that this construc-
tion can be applied for the appropriate fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge. The
proof is given in terms of commutative diagramms between predicate transformers that
are the interpretations of non-closed formulas.
The model checking problem for the decidable fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus
is non-elementary hard due to the non-elementary hardness of the model-checking prob-
lem for the linear temporal logic of knowledge [22]. In the full version of this paper [?],
we provide a self-contained proof of this result, by a reduction of the emptiness problem
for star-free regular expressions.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in the next section we recall the predicate
transformer semantics of the µ-calculus and adapt it to our epistemic extension, both
for the tree interpretation and the finitary interpretation. We then give our weak variant
of the Finite Model Theorem for the classical µ-calculus in the third section. The fourth
section serves for introducing our fragment of the epistemic µ-calculus and for proving
the decidability of its model-checking problem. We end with a section with conclusions
and comments.
2 Preliminaries
We start by fixing a series of notions and notations used in the rest of the paper.
A∗ denotes the set of words over A. The length of α ∈ A∗, is denoted ∣α∣ and the
prefix of α up to position i is denoted α[1..i]. Hence, α[1..0] = ε is the empty word.
The (strict) prefix ordering on A∗ is denoted ⪯ (≺).
Given a set A and an integer n ∈ N, an A-tree of outdegree ≤ n is a partial function
t ∶ [1 . . . n]∗ ⇀ A whose support, denoted supp(t), is a prefix-closed subset of the finite
sequences of integers in [1 . . . n]. A node of t is an element of its support. A path in t is
a pair (x, ρ) consisting of a node x and the sequence of t-labels of all the nodes which
are prefixes of x, ρ = (t(x[1 . . . i]))
0≤i≤∣x∣
.
A multi-agent system (MAS, for short) is a tupleM = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π)
with Ag being the set of agents, Q the set of states, q0 the initial state of the system,
δ ⊆ Q ×Q, Π the set of atomic propositions, π ∶ Q → 2Π and for all a ∈ Ag, Πa ⊆ Π .
A run in the structure M from a state q0 is an infinite sequence of states ρ = q0q1q2...
such that (qi, qi+1) ∈ δ for all i ≥ 0. The set of finite runs in M is denoted Runs(M).
Throughout this paper we consider only finite systems, with Q = {1, . . . , n} and q0 = 1,
and we assume that Q contains only reachable states.
The 2Π-tree representing the unfolding of a MAS M , denoted tM , is defined by
supp(tM) = {x ∈ N∗ ∣ 1x ∈ Runs(M)} and tM(x) = x[∣x∣]. For any two positions
x, y ∈ supp(tM) with ∣x∣ = ∣y∣, we denote x ∼a y if for any n ≤ ∣x∣ we have that
π(t(x[1..n])) ∩Πa = π(t(y[1..n])) ∩Πa
Henceforth, for a wordw ∈ (2Π)∗, byw
Πa
we denote the sequence defined byw
Πa
[i] =
w[i] ∩Πa for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ∣w∣. Note also that the relation x ∼a x′ is both a relation on
the nodes of the tree tM and on the runs of M .
Predicate transformers: Given a set A, an A-transformer is a mapping f ∶ (2A)n →
2
A
.
Following the Knaster-Tarski theorem, any monotone A-transformer f ∶ 2A → 2A
has a unique least and greatest fixpoint, denoted lfpf , resp. gfpf .
For an A-transformer f ∶ (2A)n → 2A, a tuple of sets B1, . . . ,Bn ⊆ A and some
k ≤ n we denote fk(B1, . . . ,Bk−1, ⋅,Bk+1, . . . ,Bn) ∶ 2A → 2A the A-transformer with
fk(B1, . . . ,Bk−1, ⋅,Bk+1, . . . ,Bn)(B) = f(B1, . . . ,Bk−1,B,Bk+1, . . . ,Bn)
Note that when f is monotone, fk(B1, . . . ,Bk−1, ⋅,Bk+1, . . . ,Bn) is monotone too.
Hence, both lfpfk(B1,...,Bk−1,⋅,Bk+1,...,Bn) and gfpfk(B1,...,Bk−1,⋅,Bk+1,...,Bn) exist. These
fixpoints can also be seen as the following A-transformers: lfpkf ∶ (2A)n → 2A and
gfp
k
f ∶ (2A)n → 2A, defined respectively as:
lfp
k
f(B1, . . . ,Bn) = lfpfk(B1,...,Bk−1,⋅,Bk+1,...,Bn)
gfp
k
f(B1, . . . ,Bn) = gfpfk(B1,...,Bk−1,⋅,Bk+1,...,Bn)
Note that both these A-transformers are constant in their k-th argument. It is also
known that both these A-transformers are monotone if f is monotone.
3 The µ-calculus of Knowledge
Syntax: The syntax of the µ-calculus of knowledge (in positive form) is based on
the following sets of symbols: a finite set of agents Ag, a family of finite sets of
atomic propositions (Πa)a∈Ag (no restrictions apply on the pairwise intersections be-
tween these sets), with Π = ⋃a∈AgΠa, and a finite set of second-order variables
Z = {Z1, . . . , Zk}. The set Πa represents the set of atoms whose value is observable
by agent a at each instant (in the sense to be developed further).
The grammar for the formulas of the µ-calculus of knowledge is:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬p ∣ Z ∣ ϕ ∧ ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ϕ ∣ AXϕ ∣ EXϕ ∣Kaφ ∣ Paφ ∣ µZ.ϕ ∣ νZ.ϕ
where p ∈ Π , a ∈ Ag and Z ∈ Z . Formulas of the type Kaφ are read as agent a knows
that φ holds. The dual of Ka, denoted Pa, (and definable as Paφ = ¬Ka¬φ if negation
were allowed), reads as agent a considers that φ is possible. As usual, for a subset of
agents A ⊆ Ag we may denoteEA the “everybody knows” operator,EAφ = ⋀a∈AKaφ.
The fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge which does not involve the knowledge
operator Ka (or its dual) is called here the plain µ-calculus, or simply the µ-calculus,
when there’s no risk of confusion. As usual, we say that a formula φ is closed if each
variable Z in φ occurs in the scope of a fixpoint operator for Z .
We will also briefly consider in this paper the modal µ-calculus of knowledge, for
the sake of comparison with other combinations of temporal and epistemic logics. It has
almost the same grammar, but with the nexttime operators EX and AX replaced with
modal nexttime operators ⟨α⟩, resp. [α] with α representing a tuple of action symbols
α = (αa)a∈Ag . Note that the modal µ-calculus of knowledge can be translated to the
non-modal µ-calculus of knowledge by converting each action name α ∈ Acta into an
atomic proposition, so the main results of this paper generalize easily to this calculus.
We give two semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge: a tree semantics and a fini-
tary semantics. The tree semantics is required because we assume that agents have
perfect recall, and hence they remember all observations made since the system started.
The second is necessary for the decision problem. The equivalence between the two
semantics on trees generated by MASs, which gives the decidability of the model-
checking problem, is a weak form of memoryless determinacy for tree automata. We
present here both semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge in a predicate-transformer
flavor, more appropriate for stating a number of properties of the logic.
The tree semantics of the µ-calculus of knowledge is given in terms of 2Π∪Z -trees. For
a given tree t, each formula φ which contains variables Z1, . . . , Zn is associated with a
supp(t)-transformer ∥φ∥ ∶ (2supp(t))n → 2supp(t) by structural induction, as follows:
– The two atoms p and ¬p are interpreted as constant supp(t)-transformers ∥p∥ ∶
(2supp(t))n → 2supp(t) and ∥¬p∥ ∶ (2supp(t))n → 2supp(t), defined by the sets ∥p∥ =
{x ∈ supp(t) ∣ p ∈ π(t(x))}, resp. ∥¬p∥ = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ p /∈ π(t(x))}.
– Each variable Zi ∈ Z is interpreted as the i-th projection on (2supp(t))n, that is,
as the supp(t)-transformer ∥Zi∥ ∶ (2supp(t))n → 2supp(t) with ∥Zi∥(S1, . . . , Sn) =
Si,∀S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ supp(t).
– ∥φ1 ∨ φ2∥ = ∥φ1∥ ∪ ∥φ2∥ and ∥φ1 ∧ φ2∥ = ∥φ1∥ ∩ ∥φ2∥.
– Each of the two nexttime operators is mapped to a supp(t)-transformer, denoted
AX , resp. EX ∶ 2supp(t) → 2supp(t), defined as follows: for each S ⊆ supp(t),
AX(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ ∀i ∈ N if xi ∈ supp(t) then xi ∈ S}
EX(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ ∃i ∈ N with xi ∈ supp(t) and xi ∈ S}
Then ∥AXφ∥ = AX ○ ∥φ∥, and ∥EXφ∥ = EX ○ ∥φ∥.
– Each pair of epistemic operators is mapped to supp(t)-transformers Ka, resp. Pa ∶
2
supp(t) → 2supp(t), defined as follows: for each S ⊆ supp(t),
Ka(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ ∀y ∈ supp(t) with x ∼a y we have y ∈ S}
Pa(S) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ ∃y ∈ supp(t) with x ∼a y and y ∈ S}
Then ∥Kaφ∥ =Ka ○ ∥φ∥ and ∥Paφ∥ = Pa ○ ∥φ∥.
– For the fixpoint operators we put ∥µZi.φ∥ = lfpi∥φ∥ and ∥νZi.φ∥ = gfpi∥φ∥.
Note that the two supp(t)-transformersKa and Pa are dual and we have that Ka(S) =
Pa(S), with ⋅ denoting the set complementation. We also denote t ⊧ φ iff ε ∈ ∥φ∥.
The following property says that the µ-calculus of knowledge cannot distinguish
between isomorphic trees:
Proposition 1. For any two MASs M1 and M2 for which there exists some tree isomor-
phism χ ∶ 2supp(tM1 ) → 2supp(tM2 ), and for any µ-calculus of knowledge formula φ,
the following diagram commutes:
(2supp(t1))n ∥φ∥M1✲ 2supp(t2)
(2supp(t2))n
(χ)n
❄ ∥φ∥M2✲ 2supp(t2)
χ
❄
(1)
Proof. By straightforward structural induction on the formula φ.
LetS1, ..., Sn ⊆ 2supp(t1). We have to prove thatχ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = ∥φ∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
1. For φ = p we have that
χ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ({x ∈ tM1 ∣ φ ∈ tM1(x)})
= {χ(x) ∣ x ∈ tM1 , φ ∈ tM1(x)}
= {y ∈ tM2 ∣ ∃x ∈ tM1 with φ ∈ tM1(x)s.t.χ(x) = y} since χ is a bijection
= {y ∈ tM2 ∣ φ ∈ tM2(y)}
= ∥φ∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))
The proof is similar for φ = ¬p.
2. For φ = Zi ∈ Z , ∥φ∥M1(S1, ...Sn) = Si. Then,
χ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ(Si) = ∥φ∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
3. For φ = φ1 ∨ φ2, we have ∥φ∥ = ∥φ1∥ ∪ ∥φ2∥. By assuming that the property holds
for φ1 and φ2, we get
χ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn) ∪ ∥φ2∥M1(S1, ..., Sn))
= χ(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) ∪ χ(∥φ2∥M1(S1, ..., Sn))
= ∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)) ∪ ∥φ2∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))
= ∥φ1 ∨ φ2∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
We similar proof can be given for φ = φ1 ∧ φ2.
4. For φ = AXφ1, ∥φ∥ = AX ○ ∥φ1∥. We have that
χ(∥AXφ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ(AX(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)))
= {χ(x) ∣ x ∈ supp(tM1) and ∀i ∈ N, if xi ∈ supp(tM1)
then tM1(xi) ∈ ∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)}
= {y ∣ χ−1(y) ∈ supp(tM1) and ∀j ∈ N, if χ−1(y)χ−1(j) ∈ supp(tM1),
then tM1(χ−1(y)χ−1(j)) ∈ ∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)} since χ is bijective
= {y ∣ y ∈ supp(tM2) and ∀j ∈ N, if yj ∈ supp(tM2)
then tM2(yj) ∈ χ(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn))}
= {y ∈ supp(tM2) ∣ ∀j ∈ N if yj ∈ supp(tM2)
then tM2(yj) ∈ ∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))}
= AX(∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)))
= AX ○ ∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))
= ∥AXφ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
The proof is similar for φ = EXφ1.
5. For φ =Kaφ1, ∥φ∥ =Ka ○ ∥φ1∥. Then,
χ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ(Ka(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)))
= χ({x ∈ supp(tM1) ∣ ∀y ∈ supp(tM1) with x ∼a y
we have y ∈ ∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)})
= {χ(x) ∈ supp(tM2) ∣ s ∈ supp(tM1 and ∀y ∈ supp(tM1 with x ∼a y
we have y ∈ ∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)}
= {x′ ∈ supp(tM2) ∣ ∀χ−1(y′) ∈ supp(tM1 with χ−1(x′) ∼a χ−1(y′)
we have χ−1(y′) ∈ ∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)}
= {x′ ∈ supp(tM2) ∣ ∀y′ ∈ supp(tM2) with x′ ∼a y′
we have y′ ∈ χ(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn))}
=Ka(χ(∥φ1∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)))
=Ka(∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)))
=Ka ○ ∥φ1∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))
= ∥φ∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
A similar proof can be given for φ = Paφ1.
6. For φ = µZi.φ1, ∥φ∥ = lfpi∥φ∥. Hence,
χ(∥φ∥M1(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ(lfpi∥φ∥M1 (S1, ..., Sn))
= χ(lfp∥φ1∥i,M1 (S1, ..., Si−1, ⋅, Si+1, ..., Sn))
= χ(min{S ∣ ∥φ1∥i,M1(S1, ..., Si−1, S,Si+1, ..., Sn) = S})
= {minχ(S) ∣ S s.t. ∥φ1∥i,M1(S1, ..., Si−1, S,Si+1, ..., Sn) = S}
χ is monotonous
=min {χ(S) ∣ χ(∥φ1∥i,M1(S1, ..., Si−1, S,Si+1, ..., Sn)) = χ(S)}
= lfpχ(∥φ1∥i,M1 (S1,...,Si−1,⋅,Si+1,...,Sn))
inductive step
= lfp∥φ1∥i,M2 (χ(S1),...,χ(Si−1),⋅,χ(Si+1),...,χ(Sn))
= lfp
i
∥φ1∥M2
(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn))
= ∥φ∥M2(χ(S1), ..., χ(Sn)).
The proof is similar for φ = νZi.φ1.
3.1 Comparison with other temporal epistemic frameworks
We discuss the relationship between the µ-calculus of knowledge and other temporal
epistemic logics or game models with imperfect information and perfect recall.
As already noted e.g. in [20], the following fixpoint formula defines the common
knowledge operator for two agents: Ca,bφ = νZ.(φ ∧KaZ ∧KbZ).
On the other hand, it’s easy to see that the (modal variant of the) µ-calculus of
knowledge is more expressive than the alternating epistemic µ-calculus of [4], due to
the possibility to insert knowledge operators “in between” the quantifiers that occur in
the semantics of the coalition operators. The relationship with ATLiR is more involved,
as we detail in the sequel.
Given a set of agents A ⊆ Ag, denote ActA the cartesian product of the set of action
symbols for each agent in A, ActA = ⨉a∈AActa. Then, formulas of the type ⟪A⟫ ◻ p
can be expressed as the fixpoint formula νZ. ⋁
α∈Acta
Ka(p ∧ ⋀
β∈ActAg∖{a}
[α,β]Z).
Formulas containing the until operator cannot be translated into the µ-calculus of
knowledge. The reason is similar to the one explained in [4]: in formulas of the type
⟪a⟫ ◇ p the objective p might not be observable by the agent a, who might only be
able to know that, at some given time instance, sometimes in the past, the objective was
achieved on all identically observable traces.
Given an ATLiR formula φ = ⟪a⟫p1Up2 where p1 and p2 are atomic proposition, a
MAS M and a finite run ρ in M , the instance of the model-checking problem M,ρ ⊧ φ
can be translated to an instance of the model-checking problem in the modal µ-calculus
of knowledge of the following formula:
µZ. ⋁
α∈Acta
Ka(p2 ∨ pastp2 ∨ (p1 ∧ ⋀
β∈ActAg∖{a}
[α,β]Z))
and the modified system M ′, in which are created some copies of the successors of
the states s labelled with the atomic proposition p2 and the corresponding paths. The
copies are labelled with the existing atomic propositions in the successor of s to which
is added the new atomic proposition pastp2 . It will label all the states occurring after
state s carrying a p2. This mechanism is similar with the “bookkeeping” employed in
the two-player games utilized in [7] for checking whether the same formula φ holds at
a state of a MAS.
The formalisation of the modification of M is given below: For any multi-agent
system M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π, (Acta)a∈Ag), we compute the multi-agent
system M ′ such that M ′ = (Q′,Ag, δ′, q′
0
,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π′, (Act′a)a∈Ag) with Q′ =
Q × {0,1}, q′0 = (q0,0), π′(q,0) = π(q), π′(q,1) = π(q) ∪ {pastp2}, Act′a = Acta ×
{0,1},∀a ∈ Ag and the transition relation defined as: For any transition q (α,β)ÐÐÐ→ r
where α ∈ Acta and β = β1,⋯, βn with βi ∈ ActAg∖{a}, in M ′ we have:
– (q,0) ((α,0),β)ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (r,0)
– (q,1) ((α,x),β)ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (r,1), x ∈ {0,1}
– (q,0) ((α,1),β)ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (r,1) if p ∈ π(q)
– (q,0) ((α,1),β)ÐÐÐÐÐ→ (r,0) if p /∈ π(q)
Given a run ρ = q0
α1Ð→ q1
α2Ð→ ... we denote qi by ρ[i], i = 0, ..., ∣ρ∣ and αi+1 by
act(ρ, i), i = 0, ..., ∣ρ∣ − 1. We redefine the tree unfolding for the multi player games as
being a partial mapping tM = (tnodeM , tedgeM ) with tnodeM ∶ N ⇀ Q , tnodeM (x) = π(x[∣x∣])
and tedgeM ∶ N ⇀ Πa∈AgActa, t
edge
M (xi) = α if x
α
Ð→ xi where α = (α1, ..., αk) ∈
Πa∈AgActa. In this case, we say that two runs ρ and ρ′ are indistinguishable (obser-
vationally equivalent) to a coalition A (and note ρ ∼A ρ′) if ∣ρ∣ = ∣ρ′∣, act(ρ, i) A =
act(ρ′, i)
A
for all i < ∣ρ∣, and πA(ρ[i]) = πA(ρ′[i]) for all i ≤ ∣ρ∣.
We define a strategy, as it is defined in [7], σ for a coalition A as any mapping
σ ∶ (2ΠA)∗ → ActA. A strategy σ is compatible with a run ρ = q0 α1Ð→ q1 α2Ð→ ... if
σ(πA(ρ[0])...πA(ρ[i])) = αi+1 A for all i ≤ ∣ρ∣. If σ is compatible with a run ρ, then it
is compatible with any run that is indistinguishable from ρ to A.
We also use [α]p to express the fact that for all the successors xi of x for which
t
edge
M (xi) = α we have that p ∈ π(tnodeM (xi)).
In order to prove the equivalence between the two problems, we prove that for any
system M and any ATLiR formula φ = ⟪a⟫p1Up2, there exists a system M ′ as defined
below and a formula φ′ = µZ.⋁α∈Acta Ka(p2 ∨ pastp2 ∨ (p1 ∧⋀β∈ActAg∖{a}[α,β]Z))
such that for any run ρ in M and any run ρ in M ′ for which the projection in M is ρ,
M,ρ ⊧ φ if and only if M ′, ρ ⊧ φ′.
This construction can be extended to the whole ATL by structural induction on the
formula.
Multi-player games with incomplete information can also be translated into the µ-
calculus of knowledge. Recall briefly that a (synchronous) two-player game is a tuple
G = (Q,Ag, (Acta)a∈Ag, δ,Q0, (Obsa)a∈Ag, (oa)a∈Ag, par) with Q denoting the set
of states,Ag = {A,B} the set of players, δ ⊆ Q×⨉a∈AgActa×Q denoting the transition
relation, oa ∶ Q → Obsa denoting the observability relation for player a and par ∶ Q →
N defining the parity of each state.
A player a ∈ Ag plays by choosing a feasible strategy, which is a mapping σ ∶
(Obsa)∗ → Acta. A strategy for a is winning when all the runs that are compatible with
that strategy satisfy the property: the maximal parity of a state which occurs infinitely
often in the run is even. The winning condition might be non-observable to a, as it might
happen that two identically observable states q1, q2 ∈ Q might have different parities.
The set of winning strategies for a player in a multi-player game with imperfect
information is then expressible within the µ-calculus of knowledge, similarly to the
known encoding of the set of winning strategies in a parity game into the µ-calculus
from e.g. [10, 18]. Assuming that the largest parity in Q is even and the atomic propo-
sition pi holds exactly in all states with parity i, the following µ-calculus of knowledge
formula encodes the winning strategies for player a:
νZnµZn−1 . . . µZ1. ⋁
α∈Acta
Ka ⋁
i≤n
(pi ∧ ⋀
β∈ActAg∖{a}
[α,β]Zi)
3.2 The model-checking problem
The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of knowledge is the problem of decid-
ing, given a MAS M and a closed formula φ, whether tM ⊧ φ.
The undecidability of the model-checking problem for combinations of temporal
and epistemic logics based on a synchronous and perfect recall semantics and contain-
ing the common knowledge operator [22, 21] implies the following result.
Theorem 1. The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of knowledge is undecid-
able.
The next two sections are dedicated to finding a fragment of the µ-calculus of
knowledge with a decidable model-checking problem.
4 Revisiting the Decidability of the Model-checking Problem for
the Tree Semantics of the plain µ-calculus
Given a multi-agent system M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π), and an agent a ∈ Ag,
we may define the relation ΓMa ⊆ Q ×Q as follows: (q, r) ∈ ΓMa if for any run ρ in M
ending in q (i.e. ρ[∣ρ∣] = q) there exists a run ρ′ ending in r with ρ ∼a ρ′. Whenever the
MAS M is understood from the context, we use the notation Γa instead of ΓMa .
We now define a second semantics for the µ-calculus of knowledge, which works
on the set of states of a MAS M . Each formula φ which contains variables Z1, . . . , Zn
is associated with a Q-transformer ⌈φ⌉ ∶ (2Q)n → 2Q, again by structural induction:
– ⌈p⌉ resp. ⌈¬p⌉ are the constant Q-transformers ⌈p⌉ = {q ∈ Q ∣ p ∈ π(q)}, resp.
⌈¬p⌉ = {q ∈ Q ∣ p /∈ π(q)}.
– ⌈Zi⌉ ∶ (2Q)n → 2Q is the i-th projection, i.e., givenS1, . . . , Sn ⊆ Q, ⌈Zi⌉(S1, . . . , Sn) =
Si.
– ⌈φ1 ∨ φ2⌉ = ⌈φ1⌉ ∪ ⌈φ2⌉, and ⌈φ1 ∧ φ2⌉ = ⌈φ1⌉ ∩ ⌈φ2⌉.
– Both nexttime modalities are associated with Q-transformers AXf ,EXf ∶ 2Q →
2
Q defined as:
AXf(S) = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∀r ∈ Q if (q, r) ∈ δ then r ∈ S}
EXf(S) = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∃r ∈ Q with (q, r) ∈ δ and r ∈ S}
Then ⌈AXφ⌉ = AXf ○ ⌈φ⌉ and, similarly, ⌈EXφ⌉ = EXf ○ ⌈φ⌉,
– Both epistemic operators are associated with Q-transformers Kfa , P fa ∶ 2Q → 2Q
defined as:
Kfa (S) = Γa(S) ={q ∈ Q ∣ ∀s ∈ Q, if (s, q) ∈ Γa then s ∈ S}
P fa (S) = Γa(S) ={q ∈ Q ∣ ∃s ∈ S s.t. (s, q) ∈ Γa}
Then ⌈Paφ⌉ = P fa ○ ⌈φ⌉ and ⌈Kaφ⌉ =Kfa ○ ⌈φ⌉.
– ⌈µZi.φ⌉ = lfpi⌈φ⌉ and ⌈νZi.φ⌉ = gfpi⌈φ⌉.
The following result represents a variant of the Finite Model Theorem for µ-calculus
and is proved by structural induction on the formula φ in [?]:
Theorem 2. Given a MASM = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π) in whichQ = {1, . . . , n}
and q0 = 1, and a (plain) µ-calculus formula φ, the following diagram commutes:
(2Q)n ⌈φ⌉ ✲ 2Q
(2supp(t))n
(t−1M )n ❄ ∥φ∥ ✲ 2supp(t)
t−1M❄
(2)
We also say that the diagram 2 holds (or commutes) for the formula φ in the system M .
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on the formula φ. Note first that the diagram
2 holds for the base cases:
t−1M (⌈p⌉) = ∥p∥ t−1M (⌈¬p⌉) = ∥¬p∥
t−1M (⌈Zi⌉(S1, . . . , Sn)) = ∥Zi∥(S1, . . . , Sn) for all Sj ⊆ Q, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The induction step relies on two groups of properties: on one side, the commutativ-
ity of t−1M with finite unions/intersections, and two commutativity diagrams relating t−1M
with the mappings AX /AXf , resp. EX /EXf . The second group of properties is rep-
resented by two characterizations for the restrictions of lfpi∥φ∥ and gfp
i
∥φ∥ on tM -regular
sets of nodes of tM .
The first group of properties is summarized in the following identities:
1. For any two sets S1, S2 ⊆ Q,
t−1M (S1 ∪ S2) = t−1M (S1) ∪ t−1M (S2)
t−1M (S1 ∩ S2) = t−1M (S1) ∩ t−1M (S2)
2. For any set S ⊆Q,
t−1M (AXf(S)) = AX(t−1M (S))
t−1M (EXf(S)) = EX(t−1M (S))
The following property is essential for the induction step involving the fixpoint op-
erators:
Claim. Suppose φ is a µ-calculus formula for which the commutative diagram 2 holds.
Given S ∈ (2Q)n with S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and an index i ≤ n, denote φˆi
S
the function
φˆi
S
∶ 2
supp(tM ) → 2supp(tM)
φˆi
S
(T ) = ∥φ∥(t−1M (S1), . . . , t−1M (Si−1), T, t−1M (Si+1), . . . , t−1M (Sn)) (3)
Also denote ⌈φˆi
S
⌉ the function ⌈φˆi
S
⌉ ∶ 2Q → 2Q with
⌈φˆi
S
⌉(R) = ⌈φ⌉(S1, . . . , Si−1,R,Si+1, . . . , Sn)
Then lfp
φˆi
S
= t−1M (lfp⌈φˆi
S
⌉) and gfpφˆi
S
= t−1M (gfp⌈φˆi
S
⌉)).
Proof. We may prove by induction on j ∈ N that
(φˆi
S
)j(∅) = t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉
j(∅)) (4)
where the first empty set is an element of 2supp(tM) whereas the second is an element of
2
Q
.
The base case is straightforward, since, for j = 0, Identity 4 reduces to ∅ = t−1M (∅).
For the induction step we may use the induction hypothesis about the commutative
diagram 2 (applied for producing the third identity below) to conclude that:
(φˆi
S
)j+1(∅) = (φˆi
S
)((φˆi
S
)j(∅))
= (φˆi
S
)(t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉
j(∅)))
= ∥φ∥(t−1M (S1), . . . , t−1M (Si−1), t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉
j(∅)), t−1M (Si+1), . . . , t−1M (Sn))
= t−1M (⌈φ⌉(S1, . . . , Si−1, ⌈φˆiS⌉
j(∅), Si+1, . . . , Sn))
= t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉(⌈φˆ
i
S
⌉j(∅)))
= t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉
j+1(∅))
We then need to prove that (⌈φˆi
S
⌉j(∅))
j≥0
is an increasing sequence of subsets
of Q. To that end, we will prove that ⌈φˆi⋅ ⌉(⋅) is monotonously increasing in both ar-
guments. That is, ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
S2
⌉(S′′) for all S′ ⊆ S′′ ∈ 2Q and for all S1 =
(S11, S12, ..., S1n) and S2 = (S21, S22, ..., S2n) with S1k ⊆ S2k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. This
can be proved by induction on the structure of φ as follows:
1. For φ = p or φ = ¬p, the property holds since in this case ⌈φ⌉ is constant.
2. For φ = Zr, ⌈φ⌉ is the r-th projection. If r = i, then ⌈φˆiS1⌉(S
′) = S′ ⊆ S′′ =
⌈φˆi
S2
⌉(S′′). Otherwise, ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) = S1r ⊆ S2r = ⌈φˆi
S2
⌉(S′′).
3. For φ = φ1∨φ2, ⌈φ⌉ = ⌈φ1⌉∪⌈φ2⌉. Since ⌈φˆi
S
⌉(S′) = ⌈φ⌉(S1, ..., Si−1, S′, Si+1, ..., Sn),
assuming that the property holds for φ1 and φ2, ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′) and
⌈φˆi
2,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
2,S2
⌉(S′′). Hence, ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ∪ ⌈φˆi
2,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′) ∪
⌈φˆi
2,S2
⌉(S′′) and therefore ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
S2
⌉(S′′).
For φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 the proof is similar.
4. For φ = AXφ1, ⌈φ⌉ = AXf ○ ⌈φ1⌉ = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∀r ∈ Q, if q → r ∈ δ then r ∈ ⌈φ1⌉}.
That is, the predecessors of nodes in ⌈φ1⌉ that have no successors outside ⌈φ1⌉.
It is easy to see that AXf is monotonous using the definition: given S1, S2 ∈ 2Q,
S1 ⊆ S2, we have
AXf(S1) = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∀r ∈ Q, if q → r ∈ δ then r ∈ S1}
and since S1 ⊆ S2, if r ∈ S1, then r ∈ S2. Hence,
AXf(S1) ⊆ {q ∈ Q ∣ ∀r ∈ Q, if q → r ∈ δ then r ∈ S2} = AXf(S2).
Then, since ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′), by applying AXf which is monotonous,
we obtain that AXf(⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′)) ⊆ AXf(⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′)). That is, ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) ⊆
⌈φˆi
S2
⌉(S′′). A similar proof can be given for φ = EXφ1.
5. For φ =Kaφ1, ⌈φ⌉(S) =Kfa ○ ⌈φ1⌉(S) = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∀s ∈ Q with (s, q) ∈ Γa then s ∈
⌈φ1⌉(S)}. We can prove, as we did in the case ofAXf , that Kfa is monotonous and
applying it to ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′) from the inductive hypothesis, we obtain
that Kfa (⌈φˆi1,S1⌉(S
′)) ⊆Kfa (⌈φˆi1,S2⌉(S
′′)). That is,⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′).
For φ = Paφ1 the proof results from the duality of Kfa and P fa , i.e., P fa (S) =
K
f
a (S). We have that ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′) and then ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊇ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′).
ApplyingKfa to it and then computing the dual set, we have thatK
f
a (⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′)) ⊆
K
f
a (⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′)). That is, P fa (⌈φˆi1,S1⌉(S
′)) ⊆ P fa (⌈φˆi1,S2⌉(S
′′)).
6. For φ = µZr.φ1, ⌈φ⌉ = lfpr⌈φ1⌉. We have that
⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) = ⌈φ⌉(S1,1, ..., S1,i−1, S′, S1,i+1, ..., S1,n)
= lfp⌈φ1⌉r(S1,1,...,S1,r−1,⋅,S1,r+1,...,S1,i−1,S′,S1,i+1,...,S1,n).
From the inductive hypothesis we have that ⌈φˆi
1,S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
1,S2
⌉(S′′) and then,
by applying lfp, we obtain that
lfp⌈φ1⌉r(S1,1,...,S1,r−1,⋅,S1,r+1,...,S1,i−1,S′,S1,i+1,...,S1,n)
⊆ lfp⌈φ1⌉r(S2,1,...,S2,r−1,⋅,S2,r+1,...,S2,i−1,S′,S2,i+1,...,S2,n)
and then ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
S1
⌉(S′).
We may conclude that ⌈φˆi
S
⌉ is monotonously increasing. Now, we know that ∅ ⊆
⌈φˆi
S
⌉(∅).
By induction, we can prove that ⌈φˆi
S
⌉j(∅) ⊆ ⌈φˆi
S
⌉j+1(∅),∀j ≥ 0. Hence, (⌈φˆi
S
⌉j(∅))j≥0
is an increasing sequence of subsets.
This sequence stabilizes at a certain integer k, which is the fixpoint of ⌈φˆi
S
⌉:
lfp⌈φˆi
S
⌉ = ⌈φˆiS⌉
k(∅) = ⌈φˆi
S
⌉k+1(∅) (5)
As a consequence of this and of Identity 4, the fixpoint of φˆi
S
is reached for
lfp
φˆi
S
= t−1M (⌈φˆiS⌉
k(∅))
which ends the proof of Claim 4
Returning to the proof of Theorem 2, the induction step concerning the least fixed
point follows easily:
∥lfpiφ∥ ○ (t−1M )n(S1, . . . , Sn) = ∥lfpiφ∥(t−1M (S1), ..., t−1M (Sn)) = lfpi∥φ∥(t−1
M
(S1),...,t−1M (Sn))
= lfp
φˆi
(S1,...,Sn)
= t−1M (lfpi⌈φ⌉(S1, . . . , Sn))
where in the last step we utilized the claim above. A similar proof gives the commuta-
tion property for the greatest fixpoint. ◻
5 A Fragment of the µ-calculus of Knowledge with a Decidable
Model-Checking Problem
In this section, we first introduce some additional notations and notions. Given a MAS
M and two agents a1, a2 ∈ Ag, we say that the two agents have compatible observ-
ability if either Πa1 ⊆Πa2 or Πa1 ⊇Πa2 .
Given a formula φ, let Tφ denote the syntactic tree of φ. We also consider that,
in Tφ, each node labeled with a variable also has a successor, labeled with ⊺. This
convention brings the property that each node in Tφ whose formula is a variable has a
closed subformula (which is ⊺).
The syntactic tree is constructed by structural induction, with
– supp(Tp) = {ǫ}, Tp(ǫ) = p,
– supp(T¬p) = {ǫ}, T¬p(ǫ) = ¬p,
– supp(Z) = {ǫ,1}, TZ(ǫ) = Z , TZ(1) = ⊺,
– supp(TOpφ1) = {ǫ} ∪ {1x ∣ x ∈ supp(φ1)}, TOpφ1(ǫ) = Op, TOpφ1(1x) = Tφ1(x),
where Op ∈ {AX,EX,Ka, Pa, µZ, νZ}
– supp(Tφ1Opφ2) = {ǫ}∪ {1x ∣ x ∈ supp(φ1)}∪ {2x ∣ x ∈ supp(φ2)}, Tφ1Opφ2(ǫ) =
Op, Tφ1Opφ2(1x) = Tφ1(x), Tφ1Opφ2(2x) = Tφ2(x), Op ∈ {∧,∨}
We then denote form(x) the subformula of φ whose syntactic tree is Tφ x, i.e. the
subtree of Tφ rooted at x, and say that x is closed if form(x) is closed.
We then say that an epistemic operator Op ∈ {Ka, Pa ∣ a ∈ Ag} is non-closed at a
node x in a formula φ if form(x) is not closed, Op labels a node y ⪰ x and for all the
nodes y′ lying on the path between x and y we have that form(y′) is not closed.
For each node x ∈ supp(Tφ), we also define AgNClφ(x) as being the set of agents
a for which Ka or Pa is non-closed at x. In addition, given two distinct nodes x1 ≺ x2
with x2 being closed, we say that x2 is a nearest closed successor of x1 if no other
closed node lies on the path from x1 to x2.
Definition 1. The µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints is the fragment of the
µ-calculus of knowledge consisting of formulas φ satisfying the following property:
Any two agents a and b for which there exist epistemic operatorsOpa ∈ {Ka, Pa},
Opb ∈ {Kb, Pb} such that both Opa and Opb are not closed at some node x of
Tφ must have compatible observability, i.e. Πa ⊆Πb or Πb ⊆Πa.
All formulas of KBn [12, 13], that is, CTL with individual knowledge operators,
are formulas of the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints. Other examples of
nonmixing formulas are the following (a and b are two agents such that Πa ⊆Πb):
µZ1.(p ∨Ka(EX.Z1) ∧ νZ2.(q ∧Z1 ∧Ka(EXZ2)))
µZ1.(p ∨Ka(EX.Z1) ∧ νZ2.(q ∧Kb(EXZ2)))
Examples of formulas that are not in the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints
are (a and b are two agents such that Πa /⊆Πb and Πb /⊆Πa):
Ca,bφ = νZ.(φ ∧KaZ ∨KbZ)
µZ1.(p ∨Ka(EX.Z1) ∧ νZ2.(q ∧Z1 ∧Kb(EXZ2)))
Theorem 3. The model-checking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic
fixpoints is decidable.
The crux of the proof consists of proving a commutativity property relating t−1M
with the operators Ka/Kfa , resp. Pa/P fa , similar with the properties relating t−1M with
AX /AXf , resp. EX /EXf . Unfortunately, this commutativity property does not hold
for any MAS M , as it is shown by the following example.
1,p1 2,p13,p1
(a)
1,p1
3,p1
3,p1
3,p1
3,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
3,p1
3,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
3,p1
3,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
... ...
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) A one-agent system with Πa = {p1}, (b) The unfolding of the system in Fig. 1(a)
Example 1. Let M be the one-agent system in Fig. 1. If we put S = {1,3} then us-
ing Figure 1 b) and the definitions if Ka/Pa and Kfa /P fa , we have that Kfa ({1,3}) =
P
f
a ({2}) = {2,3} = {1}.That is,
t−1M (Kfa (S)) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 1}
Similarly,
Ka(t−1M ({1,3})) = Pa(t−1M ({2}))
= {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 2 ∨ (x[∣x∣] = 3 ∧ ∣x∣ is even)}
= {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 1 ∨ (x[∣x∣] = 3 ∧ ∣x∣ is odd)}.
We can observe that t−1M (Kfa (S)) contains only nodes of tM labeled with state 1,
whereas Ka(t−1M (S)) contains more nodes, in particular nodes labeled with 3 occurring
on the odd levels of tM .
Definition 2. Given two MASs Mi = (Qi,Ag, δi, qi0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, πi) (i = 1,2) over
the same set of atomic propositions, we say that M1 is an in-splitting of M2 if there
exists a pair of surjective mappings χ = (χst, χtr), with χst ∶ Q1 → Q2, χtr ∶ δ1 → δ2
satisfying the following properties:
1. For each q, r ∈ Q1, (q, r) ∈ δ1, χtr((q, r)) = (χst(q), χst(r)) ∈ δ2.
2. For each q ∈ Q1, π2(χst(q)) = π1(q).
3. For each q ∈ Q1, outdeg(χst(q)) = outdeg(q), where outdeg(q) is the number of
transitions starting in q.
4. χst(q10) = q20 .
The in-splitting is an isomorphism whenever χst and χtr are bijective.
Further, the pair χ = (χst, χtr) is called an in-splitting mapping. Also, we may
write χ ∶M1 →M2 to denote the fact that χ = (χst, χtr) is a witness for M1 being an
in-splitting of M2.
Note that an in-splitting mapping (term borrowed from symbolic dynamics [15])
represents a surjective functional bisimulation between two transition systems. The fol-
lowing proposition can be seen as a generalization of this remark (proof given in [?]):
Proposition 2. Consider two MASs Mi = (Qi,Ag, δi, qi0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, πi) (i = 1,2)
over the same set of atomic propositions, connected by an in-splitting mapping χ =
(χst, χtr) ∶M1 →M2. Then for any plain µ-calculus formula φ the following diagram
commutes:
(2Q1)n ⌈φ⌉M1 ✲ 2Q1
(2Q2)n
(χ−1st )n ✻
⌈φ⌉M2 ✲ 2Q2
χ−1st
✻ (6)
Proof. Let S1, ..., Sn ⊆ 2Q2 . We prove hence by structural induction on the structure of
the formula φ that
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn))
1. For φ = p we have
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = {q ∈ Q1 ∣ p ∈ π1(q)}
χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st ({q ∈ Q2 ∣ p ∈ π2(q)})
Since π2(χst(q)) = π1(q) and χst is surjective, we can conclude that
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn))
The proof is similar for φ = ¬p.
2. For φ = Zi, ⌈φ⌉ is the i-th projection and hence
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (Si) = χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)).
3. For φ = φ1 ∨ φ2, ⌈φ⌉ = ⌈φ1⌉ ∪ ⌈φ2⌉. Then,
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = ⌈φ1⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn) ∪ ⌈φ2⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)
= χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)) ∪ χ−1st (⌈φ2⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)) by induction
= χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn))
The proof for φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 is similar.
4. For φ = AXφ1, ⌈φ⌉ = AXf ○ ⌈φ1⌉.
⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) = AXf(⌈φ1⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)))
= {q ∈ Q1 ∣ ∀r ∈ Q1, if q → r ∈ δ1
then r ∈ ⌈φ1⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn))} by induction
= {q ∈ Q1 ∣ ∀r ∈ Q1, if q → r ∈ δ1 then r ∈ χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn))}
Further, we want to prove that this set equals to
χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (AXf(⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)))
= {χ−1st (q′) ∣ q′ ∈ Q2and∀r′ ∈ Q2, if q′ → r′ ∈ δ2 then r′ ∈ ⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)}
We prove it by double inclusion. Let first take a q in the first set. We have that
for all r ∈ Q1, if q → r ∈ δ1 then r ∈ χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)). From the sur-
jectivity of χst and χtr and properties 1) and 3) in Definition 13, there is a q′ ∈
Q2 such that q ∈ χ−1st (q′) and for all r′ = χst(r) ∈ Q2, if q′ → r′ then r′ ∈
χst(χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn))). That is, using again the surjectivity, for all r′ ∈ Q2,
if q′ → r′ then r′ ∈ ⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn).
For the inverse inclusion, take q′ ∈ Q2 s.t. for all r′ ∈ Q2, if q′ → r′ ∈ δ2 then r′ ∈
⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn). Again, from the surjectivity of χst and χtr and properties 1)
and 3) in the above definition we have that there exists q ∈ Q1 s.t. χst(q) = q′
and for any transition q′ → r′ ∈ δ2 we have transition q → r ∈ δ1 such that
q′ → r′ = χst(q) → χst(r). Since χst is surjective and property 3) holds, if
q′ ∈ Q2, r
′
∈ Q2 with q′ → r′ ∈ δ2 implies that r′ ∈ ⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn), then
there exists q ∈ Q1, q ∈ χ−1st (q′) s.t. for all r = χ−1st (r′) ∈ Q1, if q → r ∈ δ1 then r ∈
χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)). We can then conclude that ⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn)) =
χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)).
5. For φ = µZr.φ1, ⌈φ⌉ = lfpi⌈φ1⌉.
χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2(S1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (lfpi⌈φ1⌉M2 (S1, ..., Sn))
= χ−1st (lfp⌈φ⌉i,M2 (S1,...,Si−1,⋅,Si+1,...,Sn))
= χ−1st (min{S ∣ ⌈φ1⌉i,M2(S1, ..., Si−1, S,Si+1, ..., Sn) = S})
since χ−1st is monotonous
=min{χ−1st (S) ∣ χ−1st (⌈φ1⌉1,M2(S1, ..., Si−1, S,Si+1, ..., Sn)) = χ−1st (S)}
= lfpχ−1st (⌈φ1⌉i,M2 (S1,...,Si−1,⋅,Si+1,...,Sn))
from inductive hypothesis
= lfp⌈φ1⌉i,M1 (χ
−1
st (S1,...,Si−1,⋅,Si+1,...,Sn))
= lfp
i
⌈φ1⌉M1
(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn))
= ⌈φ⌉M1(χ−1st (S1, ..., Sn))
Remark 4 Proposition 2 does not hold for general µ-calculus of knowledge formulas.
To see this, consider the system depicted in Fig. 2 (a), which is an in-splitting of the
system from Fig. 1 (a), resulting from splitting state 3 in two states, denoted 3 and 4,
(i.e. χ(1) = 1, χ(2) = 2, χ(3) = χ(4) = 3) with transitions (3,4) ∈ δ and (4,4) ∈ δ.
1,p1 2,p13,p14,p1
(a)
1,p1
3,p1
4,p1
4,p1
4,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
3,p1
4,p1
4,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
3,p1
4,p1
4,p1
...
2,p1
1,p1
3,p1 2,p1
... ...
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) An in-splitting of the system from Fig. 1 ; (b)The unfolding of the system from Fig. 2(a)
Note that Kfa ({1,4}) = P fa ({2,3}) = {2,3} = {1,4} and hence,
t−1M (Kfa ({1,4})) = {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 1 ∨ x[∣x∣] = 4}
On the other hand,
Ka(t−1M ({1,4})) = Pa(t−1M ({2,3}))
= {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 2 ∨ x[∣x∣] = 3 ∨ (x[∣x∣] = 4 ∧ ∣x∣ is even)}
= {x ∈ supp(t) ∣ x[∣x∣] = 1 ∨ (x[∣x∣] = 4 ∧ ∣x∣ is odd)}.
That is, t−1M (Kfa (S)) contains all nodes of tM labelled with states 1 or 4, whereas
Ka(t−1M (S)) contains fewer nodes, in particular nodes labelled with 1 and nodes la-
belled with 4 occurring on the odd levels of tM .
The following notion corresponds with the “determinization” used for model-checking
LTLK/CTLK [22, 8] or solving 2-player parity games with one player having incom-
plete information [6]:
Definition 3. Given a MAS M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π), we define the multi
agent system ∆prea (M) = (Q˜pre,Ag, δ˜, q˜0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π˜) as follows:
– Q˜pre = {(s,S) ∣ s ∈ Q,S ⊆ {q ∈ Q ∣ πa(q) = πa(s)}} and q˜0 = (q0,{q0}).
– δ˜ is composed of all tuples of the form ((s,S), (r,R)) where (s, r) ∈ δ and R =
{r′ ∈ Q ∣ πa(r′) = πa(r) and ∃s′ ∈ S with (s′, r′) ∈ δ}.
– π˜(s,S) = π(S) = π(s).
The a-distinction of M , denoted ∆a(M), is the restriction of ∆prea (M) to reachable
states, i.e., ∆a(M) = (Q˜,Ag, δ˜ ∣Q˜, q˜0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π˜ ∣Q˜) where Q˜ = {s˜ ∈ Q˜pre ∣
s˜ is reachable from q˜0}.
Given a run ρ in Runs(∆a(M)), we denote ρ
1
the projection of ρ onto its first
component.
Lemma 1. Given a MAS M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π), the following two prop-
erties hold:
1. For each run ρ in ∆a(M) ending in (s,S),
S = {r ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′ in M that ends in r with ρ′ ∼a ρ
1
}
2. For each two runs ρ, ρ′ in ∆a(M) with ρ ending in (s,S) ∈ Q˜, if ρ′ ∼a ρ, then
there exists r ∈ Q s.t. ρ′ ends in (r,S).
Proof. We prove the first property by induction on the length of the path ρ. It easy to
see that property holds when ρ = q˜0 = (q0,{q0}). In this case, ρ′ can be only ρ.
Suppose now the property holds for any path ρ in ∆a(M) with ∣ρ∣ = n. Let ρ′ in
∆a(M) with ∣ρ′∣ = n + 1 that ends in (q,S). Then exists a path ρ′′ = ((qi, Si))
1≤i≤n
of length n such that ρ′ = ρ′′ ⋅ (q,S) with (qn+1, Sn+1) = (q,S). From the inductive
hypothesis, Sn−1 = {r ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ in M that ends in r with ρ ∼a ρ′′
1
}.
Since (qn−1, Sn−1) → (q,S) ∈ δ, by definition:
S = {r′ ∈ Q ∣ πa(r′) = πa(q) and ∃s′ ∈ Sn−1 with s′ → r′ ∈ δ}
From s′ ∈ Sn−1 we have that exists ρ in M that ends in s′ with ρ ∼a ρ′′
1
. Because
s′ → r′ ∈ δ, πa(r′) = πa(q) and ρ′ = ρ′′ ⋅ (q,S), we can conclude that there exists ρ′ in
M , ρ′ = ρ ⋅ r′ that ends in r′ with ρ′ ∼a ρ′
1
. That is,
S = {r′ ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′ in M that ends in r′ with ρ′ ∼a ρ′
1
}
For the second property we also use the induction on the length of paths ρ and ρ′.
The basic case is similar as above, since ρ′ can only be ρ.
Suppose the property holds for any ρ and any ρ′ of length n with ρ′ ∼a ρ and take ρ
and ρ′ ∈ Runs(∆a(M)) of length n + 1, with ρ that ends in (s,S) and ρ′ ∼a ρ. Denote
ρ = ((qi, Si))
1≤i≤n
and ρ′ = ((q′i, S′i))1≤i≤n. Because ρ ∼a ρ
′
, we have that ρ ∼a ρ′ and
then (q′n, S′n) = (q′n, Sn).
From (qn, Sn) → (s,S) we have that
S = {r′′ ∈ Q ∣ πa(r′′) = πa(s) and ∃s′′ ∈ S′ with s′′ → r′′ ∈ δ}
and from (q′n, Sn) → (r,R),
R = {r′′ ∈ Q ∣ πa(r′′) = πa(r) and ∃s′′ ∈ S′ with s′′ → r′′ ∈ δ}
Since ρ ∼a ρ′, we have that πa(s) = πa(r) and then S = R. That is, ρ′ ends in (r,S).
Given a MAS M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π), and an agent a ∈ Ag, we say
that M is a-distinguished if Γa defined on page 10 is a congruence relation, that is,
an equivalence relation with the following property:
for any q, r ∈ Q, if qΓar, (q, q′) ∈ δ, (r, r′) ∈ δ and πa(q′) = πa(r′), then q′Γar′. (7)
Lemma 2. For a MAS M = (Q,Ag, δ, q0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, π) and an agent a ∈ Ag with
Γa a congruence relation, we have that sΓar if and only if there exists ρ and ρ′ ∈
Runs(M) s.t. ρ ends in s and ρ′ ends in r with ρ ∼a ρ′.
Proof. For the direct implication the proof follows form the definition of Γa. The proof
in the other direction is made by induction on the length of the path ρ.
We define Γna with sΓna r if and only if for any run ρ in M ending in s with ∣ρ∣ = n,
there exists a run ρ′ ending in r with ρ ∼a ρ′.
We show by induction that Γn is a congruence. It is easy to see that for the base
case, for any ρ, ∣ρ∣ = 1, there exists ρ′ = q0 ∼a ρ since ρ = q0.
Suppose that it holds for n and prove for n+1. Take ρ that ends in s, with ∣ρ∣ = n+1 for
which there exists ρ′ ending in r s.t. ρ ∼a ρ′. That means that there exists ρ that ends in
s′ = ρ[∣ρ∣−1], with ∣ρ∣ = n for which there exists ρ′ ending in r′ = ρ′[∣ρ′∣−1] s.t. ρ ∼a ρ′.
From the inductive step, we have that s′Γna r′. Since s′ → s, r′ → r, πa(s) = πa(r) and
Γa is a congruence, we can conclude that sΓn+1a r and then sΓar.
Lemma 3. Given a MAS M and an agent a ∈ Ag, for any two reachable states (q,S)
and (r,R) in ∆a(M), (q,S)Γa(r,R) if and only if S = R.
Proof. We use Lemma 1 for the proof.
In the direct sense, if (q,S) is reachable, we have that S = {s ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′ in M,ρ′ ∼a
ρ
1
}. From (q,S)Γa(r,R), we have that there exists ρ in M ending in (r,R) with
ρ ∼a ρ and
R = {s′ ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′′ in M,ρ′′ ∼a ρ
1
} = {s′ ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′′ in M,ρ′′ ∼a ρ
1
} = S
In the other direction, let take (q,S) and (r,S) two reachable states in ∆a(M) then
for all ρ that ends in (q,S) we have that
S = {s ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ′ in M,ρ′ ∼a ρ
1
}
Since (r,S) is reachable, r ∈ S. Then there exists ρ′ in M, ending in r with ρ′ ∼a ρ
1
.
Then, by the second point of Lemma 1, there exists ρ′ in ∆a(M) with ρ′ ∼a ρ which
ends the proof.
Proposition 3. 1. For any MAS M , ∆a(M) is an in-splitting of M . We denote this
in-splitting as ∆−1a,M ∶ ∆a(M) → M . Whenever the MAS M is clear from the
context, we use the notation ∆−1a instead of ∆−1a,M .
2. For any agent a ∈ Ag we have that ∆a(M) is a-distinguished.
Proof. For the first property, suppose ∆a(M) is an in-splitting of M . We define the
following mapping χ ∶ ∆a(M) → M for any q′, r′ ∈ Q˜, q′ = (q,S1) and r′ = (r,S2)
as:
χst(q′) = χst(q,S1) = q
χtr(q′ → r′) = q → r
These two mappings satisfy the properties from Definition 2 since:
χtr(q′ → r′) = q → r = χst(q′) → χst(r′)
π(χst(q′)) = π(q) = π˜(q′) by definition 3
outdeg(χst(q′)) = outdeg(q) = outdeg(q′) by definition 3
χst(q′0) = χst(q0, q0) = q0
The surjectivity follows from the definition and the assumption that we work only with
MAS in which Q contains only reachable states.
For the second property, we have to prove that Γa is a congruence relation over
∆a(M). To prove the symmetry, take (q,S)Γa(r,R) in ∆a(M). From Lemma 3, we
have that R = S.
Let now, take any path ρ′ in ∆a(M) ending in (r,S). From Lemma 1 we have that
S = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ in M, ending in q, ρ ∼a ρ′
1
}
Since (q,S) is reachable, q ∈ S and then, there exists ρ in M , ending in q such that
ρ ∼a ρ
′
1
. That is, there exists ρ ending in (q,S′) s.t. ρ ∼a ρ′ And, using the second
property of Lemma 1, we get that S′ = S, i.e.,
there exists ρ ending in (q,S) s.t. ρ ∼a ρ′
Hence (r,S)Γa(q,S) which means that Γa is symmetric. Reflexivity and transitivity
hold trivially.
For proving that Γa is a congruence, note first that, from the definition of ∆a(M)
if (q,S)→ (q′, S′) ∈ δ˜, (r,S) → (r′, S′′) ∈ δ˜ and π(q′) = π(r′), then S′ = S′′.
Suppose now that (q,S)Γa(r,S), (q,S) → (q′, S′) ∈ δ˜, (r,S) → (r′, S′) ∈ δ˜ and
π(q′, S′) = π(r′, S′). Then, (q′, S′) and (r′, S′) are reachable, and using Lemma 3 we
may conclude that (q′, S′)Γa(r′, S′) which ends on Γa is a congruence relation and
∆a(M) is a-distinguished.
Proposition 4. For any MAS M and two agents a, b ∈ Ag with Πa ⊆ Πb, if M is
b-distinguished, then ∆a(M) is b-distinguished too.
Proof. For ∆a(M) to be b-distinguished, Γ∆a(M)b has to be a congruence relation. To
prove the symmetry of Γ∆a(M)
b
, take (s,S)Γ∆a(M)
b
(r,R). Since Πa ⊆ Πb, we have
that (s,S)Γa(r,R) and then, from Lemma 3, S = R.
We then also have that for all ρ ∈ ∆a(M) ending in (s,S), there exists ρ′ ending in
(r,S), ρ ∼b ρ′. That is,
∃ρ in M ending in s for which ∃ρ′ ending in r, ρ ∼b ρ′
Since M is b-distinguished, ΓMb must be a congruence relation, and using Lemma 2 we
have that sΓMb r.
Since ΓMb is congruence, we have that rΓMb s. That is,
∀ρ′ ending in r,∃ρ ending in s s.t. ρ ∼b ρ′
Let ρ′ ending in (r,S). By lemma 1, we have that S = {q ∈ Q ∣ ∃ρ in M s.t. ρ ∼a ρ′
1
}.
Also, (s,S) is reachable, hence, s ∈ S, i.e., there exists ρ in M s.t. ρ ∼b ρ′
1
. Therefore,
there must exist ρ in ∆a(M) ending in (s,S′) s.t. ρ ∼b ρ′. Then, from the second
property of Lemma 1, we have that ρ ends in (s,S), and (r,S)Γb(s,S). That is, Γb is
symmetric.
Next, for proving that Γ∆a(M)
b
is a congruence, suppose that (r,S)Γb(s,S), r →
r′ ∈ δ, s → s′ ∈ δ and πb(s′) = πb(r′). From (r,S)Γb(s,S) and the fact that ΓMb
is a congruence relation, applying Lemma 2 we have that rΓMb s and then r′ΓMb s′. In
a similar way we write the proof for the symmetry, we prove that (r′, S′)Γb(s′, S′),
where S′ = {q′ ∈ Q ∣ πa(q′) = πa(r′) and ∃q ∈ S, q → q′ ∈ δ}.
The close relationship between the relation Γa and the epistemic operators is re-
sumed by the following proposition:
Proposition 5. For any MASM , the following diagram commutes iffM is a-distinguished:
2
Q K
f
a ✲ 2Q
2
supp(tM )
t−1M ❄
Ka✲ 2supp(tM )
tM
−1
❄
(8)
The same holds if the pair Ka/Kfa is replaced with Pa/P fa .
Proof. Suppose first that the diagram holds and prove that Γa is a congruence.
For reflexivity the proof is straightforward and the transitivity results from the tran-
sitivity of ∼a.
To prove the symmetry, take qΓar. From qΓar we have that t−1M ({r}) ⊆ Pa(t−1M ({q})).
By the diagram commutativity forPa/P fa , we have thatPa(t−1M ({q})) = t−1M (P fa ({q}))
and then t−1M ({r}) ⊆ t−1M (P fa ({q})). Applying tM , we obtain r ∈ P fa (q). That is rΓaq.
Now, if the diagram commutes for the pairKa/Kfa , recall first that for all S ⊆ 2supp(tM), Pa(S) =
Ka(S) and P fa (S) =Kfa (S),∀S ⊆ 2Q.
Thereby we havePa(t−1M (S)) =Ka(t−1M (S)) =Ka(t−1M (S)) = t−1M (Kfa (S)) = t−1M (Kfa (S)) =
t−1M (P fa (S)). That is, the diagram commutes for Pa/P fa too and we can proceed as
above for proving symmetry.
If now the diagram commutes, for proving that Γa is a congruence, take qΓar and
q → q′ ∈ δ and r → r′ ∈ δ and πa(q′) = πa(r′).
From qΓar we have that r ∈ P fa (q) and then t−1M (r) ⊆ t−1M (P fa (q)) = Pa(t−1M (q)). We
get that there exists x ∈ supp(tM), x[∣x∣] = r and x ∈ Pa(t−1M (q)) and therefore there
exists y ∈ supp(tM) with x ∼a y and y[∣y∣] = q.
Because x ∼a y, x[∣x∣] = r → r′ and y[∣y∣] = q → q′ with πa(q′) = πa(r′) we obtain
that for x′ = xr′ and y′ = yq′ with x′ ∼a y′ x′ ∈ Pa(t−1M (q′)) = t−1M (P fa (q′)). That is,
(q′, r′) ∈ Γa.
For the inverse implication, suppose that Γa is a congruence.
First, we observe that t−1M (P fa (S)) ⊆ Pa(t−1M (S)) holds from the fact that t−1M (Γa(S)) ⊆
Pa(t−1M (S)).
Recall that we defined qΓna r as: (q, r) ∈ Γna iff ∀ρ, ∣ρ∣ ≤ n ending in q, ∃ρ′ ending
in r such that ρ ∼a ρ′.
We also define P f,na (S) = {q ∈ S ∣ ∃s ∈ S, (s, q) ∈ Γna }.
We now prove by induction that Pa(t−1M (r)≤n) ⊆ t−1M (P f,na (r)) for all n ∈ N and for
all r ∈ Q.
For n = 0 the inequality trivially holds. Suppose that for n the equation holds for all
q ∈ Q. Let x ∈ supp(tM), ∣x∣ = n + 1, in Pa(t−1M (r)≤n+1). We want to prove that it is in
t−1M (P f,na (r)) too.
Since x ∈ Pa(t−1M (r)≤n+1), then there exists y ∈ supp(tM) with x ∼a y and y[∣y∣] =
r, ∣y∣ ≤ n + 1.
Let x = x′i. Then x′ ∈ Pa(t−1M (y[∣y∣ − 1])≤n) (from the inductive hypothesis and the
fact that t−1M ({r}) ⊆ t−1M (P fa ({q}))).
From the inductive hypothesis, we obtain that x′ ∈ t−1M (P f,na (y[∣y∣ − 1])) and then
(y[∣y∣ − 1], x′[∣x′∣]) ∈ Γna .
But, because x ∼a y, we have that x′[∣x′∣] → x[∣x∣] ∈ δ and y[∣y∣ − 1] → y[∣y∣] ∈ δ and
πa(x[∣x∣]) = πa(y[∣y∣]). Then, y[∣y∣]Γax[∣x∣]. This means that x ∈ t−1M (P f,n+1a (r)).
It results that, for all n ∈ N and for all r ∈ Q, Pa(t−1M (r)≤n) ⊆ t−1M (P f,na (r)) and then
Pa(t−1M (S)) ⊆ t−1M (P fa (S)), for all S which ends the proof of the reverse inclusion.
From that and from the first inclusion, we can say that Pa(t−1M (S)) = t−1M (P fa (S)),∀S.
Definition 4. We say that the pair of epistemic operators Ka/Kfa , resp. Pa/P fa , com-
mutes for M if the diagram 8 is commutative for the respective pair.
Proposition 5 gives the first restricted form which may lead to the commutativity of
Diagram 2 for formulas of the µ-calculus of knowledge. The second restricted form in
which the pair Ka/Kfa (resp. Pa/P fa ) commutes with a system is stated as point 2 in
the next proposition:
Proposition 6. Consider two MASs Mi = (Qi,Ag, δi, qi0,Π, (Πa)a∈Ag, πi) (i = 1,2),
with Q1 = {1, . . . , n1} and Q2 = {1, . . . , n2}, related by an in-splitting χ = (χst, χtr) ∶
M1 → M2, and define the tree mapping χˆ ∶ supp(tM1) → supp(tM2), where χˆ(ε) = ε
and χˆ(xi) = χˆ(x) ⋅ χst(i), for any x ∈ supp(tM1) and i ∈ Q1. Then the following
properties hold:
1. χˆ is a tree isomorphism between tM1 and tM2 and tM2 ○ χˆ = χˆ ○ tM1 .
2. For any closed formula φ of the µ-calculus of knowledge for which the diagram 2
commutes in the system M2, the following property holds:
∥φ∥M1 = t−1M1(χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2))
Proof. The first property is implied by the bijectivity of χˆ and the fact that χ is an
in-splitting and the property 3 of Definition 2.
For the second property, we may easily prove that
tM2(χˆ(x)) = χst(tM1(x)) (9)
Let x′ ∈ supp(tM1). Then, by definition of χ˜, x′ = xi for some x ∈ supp(tM1) and
i ∈ Q1.
tM2(χˆ(x′)) = tM2(χˆ(xi)) = tM2(χˆ(x) ⋅ χˆst(i)) = χˆst(i) (10)
On the other hand, we have that
χst(tM1(x′)) = χst(tM1(xi)) = χst(i) (11)
From the last two equations, we can see that Identity 9 holds for any x ∈ supp(tM1).
We may observe that χˆ(tM1(x)) = χˆ(x[∣x∣]) = χˆ(ǫ) ⋅ χst(x[∣x∣]) = χst(x[∣x∣]).
And from the Identity 9, we have that χˆ(tM1(x)) = tM2(χˆ(x)), for all x ∈ supp(tM1).
As a premise of the third property, we may observe that:
t−1M1 ○ χ
−1
st = χˆ
−1
○ t−1M2
From this, combined with the hypothesis on the commutativity of diagram 2 for φ in
M2, the isomorphism property for χˆ in Proposition 1, and Identity 9, we get:
∥φ∥M1 = χˆ−1(∥φ∥M2) = χˆ−1(t−1M2(⌈φ⌉M2)) = t−1M1(χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2))
Remark 5 The previous proposition tells us that, for closed formulas of the µ-calculus
of knowledge for which Diagram 2 commutes in M2, in the eventuality that the system
M2 needs to be replaced with a “larger” system M1 (for reasons related with the “de-
terminization” that ensures the first type of commutativity of Ka/Pa), the validity of φ
on the tree tM1 can be recovered from the set of states χ−1st (⌈φ⌉M2), through the inverse
tree mapping t−1M1 .
We have now the essential ingredients that ensure the decidability of the model-
checking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic fixpoints. The algorithm
runs as follows: we proceed by constructing the state-transformer interpretations of the
subformulas of φ on the given system M , in a bottom-up traversal of the syntactic
tree Tφ. As long as we only treat subformulas not containing any epistemic operator,
Theorem 2 ensures that these state transformers are correct finitary abstractions of the
tree semantics of our subformulas.
The first time we encounter in Tφ an epistemic operatorKa/Pa, say, the subformula
in the current node is Kaφ′, we need to replace M with its a-distinction, ∆a(M), in
order for the appropriate diagram to commute. This replacement is easier when φ′ is a
closed plain µ-calculus formula. By combining Propositions 6 and 5, the tree semantics
of the formulaKaφ′ can be computed using the state transformerKfa (∆−1a (⌈φ′⌉M)) in
∆a(M), where ∆−1a (⌈φ′⌉M) represents the set of states in ∆a(M) on which φ′ holds.
The procedure is different when φ′ is non-closed. In this situation, we cannot de-
terminize M , as observed in the remark 4. Therefore we need to descend along the
syntactic tree to all the “nearest” nodes whose formulas are closed, and only there ap-
ply the a-distinction construction, thanks to Proposition 6.
Suppose even further that φ′ itself contains other knowledge operators, and some
other knowledge operator Kb is encountered during this descent. The “nonmixing” as-
sumption on our formula implies that this other agent b has compatible observability
with our a (Ka and Kb are non-closed at the node associated with Ka). Therefore, the
a-distinction of the models applied at lower levels commutes with Kb, fact which is
ensured by Proposition 5 when the two agents have compatible observability.
This whole process ends when we arrive in the root of the syntactic tree, with an in-
splitting M ′ of the initial system M and a (constant) state-transformer σ, which gives
the finitary abstraction of the set of nodes of the tree tM where φ holds. The following
paragraphs formalize this process.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Given a formula φ in the µ-calculus of non-mixing epis-
temic fixpoints and a MAS M , we associate with each node x of Tφ an in-splitting
mapping, denoted T Insφ (x), such that the following properties hold:
1. For the root ǫ and any not closed nodex in supp(Tφ), T Insφ (ǫ) = idM andT Insφ (x) =
idM ′ , with M and M ′ appropriate MASs.
2. For any x,xi ∈ supp(Tφ), i ∈ {1,2}, codom(T Insφ (x)) = dom(T Insφ (xi)),
3. For any nodes x1, x2 ∈ supp(Tφ) with x1 ⪯ x2, the in-splitting mapping between
the two nodes is the composition of the mappings from x1 to x2. Formally,
T Insφ (x1...x2) =not T Insφ (x1) ○ ... ○ T Insφ (x2)
Then, for any x1, x2 leaves in Tφ, T Insφ (ǫ...x1) = T Insφ (ǫ...x2), where ǫ is the root.
4. For any node x1 which is a nearest closed successor of the root ǫ, if AgNClφ(ǫ) =
{a1, . . . , ak} and Πa1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Πak , then T Insφ (x1) has the form:
T Insφ (x1) =∆−1a1 ○ . . . ○∆−1ak ○ χ, for some χ,
Next, assuming that T InSφ is constructed with all the properties above, we denote
InS(T Insφ ) = T Insφ (ǫ...x) with x any leave in Tφ.
The construction of T Insφ proceeds by structural induction on φ. Whenever we want
to emphasize a property of the root of the syntactic tree Tφ, we denote it ǫφ.
For the base case we put T Insp (ǫ) = T Ins¬p (ǫ) = idM , for any p ∈ Π . For φ = Z ,
Z ∈ Z , note that, by construction, the root of TZ has a leaf successor which is the only
child node. Then, T InsZ (ǫ) = T InsZ (1) = idM .
For the induction case, take a formula φ = Op.φ′ where Op ∈ {AX,EX,µZ, νZ},
and assume T Insφ′ (x) is defined. Then we put T Insφ (1x) = T Insφ′ (x) for any node x of
supp(Tφ′), and T Insφ (ǫφ) = idM ′ , where M ′ = dom(T Insφ′ (ǫφ
′)).
Suppose φ = Kaφ′ or φ = Paφ′. Note that for each node 1x which is not closed in
Tφ, the node x is not closed in Tφ′ either. Then we put T Insφ (1x) = T Insφ′ (x) = idM ′ ,
with M ′ the appropriate MAS. We also put T Insφ (ǫφ) = IdM0 for the appropriate M0.
Furthermore, for each closed node 1x1 ∈ supp(Tφ) which not a nearest closed successor
of ǫφ, we put T Insφ (1x1) = T Insφ′ (x1).
Take further a node 1x1 which is a nearest closed successor of the root ǫφ and
AgNCL(ǫφ) = {a1, ..., ak}. By the above property 4 from the induction hypothesis,
the in-splitting mapping in x1 is of the form T Insφ′ (x1) = ∆−1a1 ○ . . . ○ ∆−1ak ○ χ with
Πa1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Πak . On the other hand, by the assumption that φ is a nonmixing formula,
a must have compatible observability with all the agents a1, . . . , ak . Therefore, there
must exist some i ≤ k such that Πa1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Πai ⊆ Πa ⊆ Πai+1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Πak . We then
define
T Insφ (1x1) =∆−1a1 ○ . . . ○∆−1ai ○∆−1a ○∆−1ai+1 ○ . . . ○∆−1ak ○ χ
Note that the domain and the codomain of each ∆−1aj , (j ≤ i) are different in T Insφ from
those in T Insφ′ , due to the insertion of ∆−1a .
According to the above constructions for φ = Kaφ′ of φ = Paφ′, all the four prop-
erties are satisfied by T Insφ , the fourth one resulting from the construction of the in-
splitting mapping for the nearest closed successors of the root.
Finally, take φ =φ1Opφ2 (Op ∈ {∧,∨}). If T Insφ1 = T Insφ2 , put T Insφ (1n) = T Insφ1 (x)
for all nodes x ∈ supp(Tφ1), T Insφ (2n)=T Insφ2 (x) for all n ∈ supp(Tφ2) and T Insφ (ǫ) =
IdM .
Suppose now T Insφ1 ≠ T
Ins
φ2
. Consider AgNCl(1) = {a1, . . . , ak} and AgNCl(2) =
{b1, . . . , bl} with Πa1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Πak and Πb1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Πbl . Take then a node x1 which is a
nearest closed successor of the root of Tφ1 , ǫφ1 , and a node x2 which is a nearest closed
successor of ǫφ2 . By the induction hypothesis we have:
T Insφ (x1) =∆−1a1 ○ . . . ○∆−1ak ○ χ1 InS(T Insφ1 ) = T Insφ (x1) ○ χ′1
T Insφ (x2) =∆−1b1 ○ . . . ○∆−1bl ○ χ2 InS(T Insφ2 ) = T Insφ (x2) ○ χ′2
with appropriate in-splittings χ1, χ′1, χ2, χ′2.
On the other hand, by the assumption on φ being nonmixing, for any i ≤ k, j ≤ l,
the two agents ai and bj must have compatible observability. It therefore follows that
there exists a reordering of the union {a1, . . . , ak} ∪ {b1, . . . , bl} as {c1, . . . , cm} such
that Πci ⊆Πci+1 for all i ≤m − 1. Denote then:
χ0 =∆
−1
c1
○ . . . ○∆−1cm
By Proposition 4, χ0 is a c-distinction for any c ∈ {a1, . . . , ak} ∪ {b1, . . . , bl}. Also,
by property 2 of the induction hypothesis, χ0 is independent of the choice of the nodes
x1, x2.
The same property from the induction hypothesis also ensures that, for any nearest
closed successor x2 of εφ2 , there exist in-splittings χφ2,x22 , χ˜
φ2,x2
2
such that:
T Insφ (x2) =∆−1b1 ○ . . . ○∆−1bl ○ χ
φ2,x2
2
InS(T Insφ2 ) = T Insφ (x2) ○ χ˜φ2,x22 (12)
We will then construct T Insφ (⋅) as follows:
1. For each closed node x which is a leaf in Tφ1 but not a nearest closed successor of
ǫφ1 , we put T Insφ (1x) = T Insφ1 (x) ○ χ2 ○ χ′2.
2. For each non-leaf, closed node x in Tφ1 which is not a nearest closed successor of
ǫφ1 we copy T Insφ (1x) = T Insφ1 (x).
3. For each nearest closed successor x of ǫφ1 which is not a leaf in Tφ1 we put
T Insφ (1x) = χ0 ○ χ1.
4. For each closed node x which is a leaf in Tφ1 and a nearest closed successor of ǫφ1 ,
we put T Insφ (1x) = χ0 ○ χ1 ○ χ′1 ○ χ2 ○ χ′2.
5. For each closed node x which is not a close successor of ǫφ2 we copy T Insφ (2x) =
T Insφ2 (x).
6. For each closed nodexwhich is a nearest closed successor of ǫφ2 we put T Insφ (2x) =
χ0 ○ χ1 ○ χ
′
1 ○ χ
φ2,x
2
, where χφ2,x
2
is the in-splitting mapping associated to node x
as in Identity 12 above.
7. For the root ǫ and the non-closed nodes x of Tφ, T Insφ (ǫ) = IdM ′ and T Insφ (x) =
IdM ′′ , with M ′ and M ′′ appropriate MASs.
It’s not difficult to see that the resulting mapping T Insφ2 (⋅) satisfies the five desired
properties. More specifically, property 2 amounts to the following identity:
InS(T Insφ ) = χ0 ○ χ1 ○ χ′1 ○ χ2 ○ χ′2
Further, let Mx denote the MAS which is the domain of the in-splitting T Insφ (x),
and denote Qx its state-space. Also, for convenience, we denote Mx the MAS which
represents the codomain of T Insφ (x), and Qx its state-space. Note that when x,x1 ∈
supp(Tφ), Mx =Mx1, and similarly Mx =Mx2 when x2 ∈ supp(Tφ).
Once we built the tree T Insφ , we associate with each node x in Tφ a state-transformer
that will give all the information on the satisfiability of form(x) in the given model.
Formally, we build a tree T strφ whose domain is supp(Tφ) ∖ {x ∣ Tφ(x) = } and
which, for each node x, represents a state-transformer T strφ (x) ∶ (2Qx)n → 2Qx . The
construction will be achieved such that
∥form(x)∥ ○ (t−1Mx)
n
= t−1Mx ○ T
str
φ (x) (13)
for each node x with form(x) ≠ .
The construction proceeds bottom-up on supp(Tφ). We actually build two trees,
T strφ and T
str
φ , such that T
str
φ (x) ∶ (2Qx)n → 2Qx and T strφ (x) = T
str
φ (x)○[(T Insφ (x))
−1]
n
,
that is,
T strφ (x)(S1, . . . , Sn) = T
str
φ (x)((T Insφ (x))
−1(S1, . . . , Sn)) (14)
Note that, once we build T strφ (x) for a node x, T strφ (x) is defined by Identity 14, so we
only explain the construction for T strφ (x).
For x leave in Tφ with Tφ(x) = p ∈ Π , we put T strφ (x) = ⌈p⌉M , the constant state-
transformer. Recall that we do not define T strφ (x) for Tφ(x) = . For Tφ(x) = Zi ∈ Z
we put T strφ (x)(S1, . . . , Sn) = Si, the i-th projection on (2Qx)n.
For nodes x with Tφ(x) = Op ∈ {AX,EX,Ka, Pa ∣ a ∈ Ag} we put
T
str
φ (x)(S1, . . . , Sn) = Op(T strφ (x1)(S1, . . . , Sn))
For Tφ(x) ∈ {∧,∨} we put T strφ (x)(S1, . . . , Sn) = (T strφ (x1)(S1, . . . , Sn))Op(T strφ (x2)(S1, . . . , Sn)).
For Tφ(x) = µZi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n we put T strφ (x) = lfpi⌈T str
φ
(x1)⌉, and, similarly, for
Tφ(x) = νZi we define T strφ (x) = gfpi⌈T str
φ
(x1)⌉.
The validity of the Identity 13 is a corollary of Propositions 5 and 6.
The final step consists of checking whether qε
0
∈ T strφ (ε), where qε0 is the initial state
in the MAS Mε associated with the root of Tφ.
The following result follows from a similar result for LTLK from [22]. A self-
contained proof can be found in [?]:
Theorem 6. The model checking problem for the µ-calculus of non-mixing epistemic
fixpoints is hard for non-elementary time.
6 Conclusions and comments
We have presented a fragment of the µ-calculus of knowledge having a decidable
model-checking problem. We argued in the introduction that the decidability result does
not seem to be achievable using tree automata or multi-player games. Two-player games
with one player having incomplete information and with non-observable winning con-
ditions from [6] do not seem to be appropriate for the whole calculus as they are only
equivalent with a restricted type of combinations of knowledge operators and fixpoints,
as shown on page 9. We conjecture that the formula νZ(p∨AX.PaZ) is not equivalent
with any (tree automaton presentation of a) two-player game with path winning condi-
tions. Translating this formula to a generalized tree automaton seems to require spec-
ifying a winning condition on concatenations of finite paths in the tree with “jumps”
between two identically-observable positions in the tree. This conjecture extends the
non-expressivity results from [4] relating ATL and µ −ATL.
The second reason for which the above-mentioned generalization would not work
comes from results in [9] showing that the satisfiability problem for CTL or LTL is un-
decidable with the concrete observability relation presented here. It is then expectable
that if a class of generalized tree automata is equivalent with the µ-calculus of non-
mixing epistemic fixpoints, then that class would have an undecidable emptiness prob-
lem and only its“testing problem” would be decidable. Therefore, the classical deter-
minacy argument for two-player games would not be translatable to such a class of
automata.
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